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Zupta’s Next Nightmare:
The South African Local Government 
Elections of 3 August 2016 
Ulf Engel 
Abstract: On 3 August 2016 South Africa held its fifth local government 
elections (LGE) since the end of Apartheid in 1994. Against a backdrop 
of increasing political frustration with the ruling party’s poor perfor-
mance and continued debates about corruption and cronyism in the 
highest government circles, the African National Congress (ANC) main-
tained its dominant position but lost 8 per cent of the aggregate vote 
(53.91 per cent). The Democratic Alliance (DA) gained some 3 per cent 
(26.89 per cent) of the vote, and the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), 
first-time LGE campaigners, garnered 8.02 per cent. Importantly, the 
ANC lost control of three of the seven big metropolitan municipalities it 
had previously held. Since there was no clear-cut majority in four of the 
eight metros, coalition politics and the art of compromise will become a 
major feature of South African politics in the coming years. The elections 
were highly competitive and considered free and fair. At 57.97 per cent, 
voter turnout was slightly higher than in 2011. 
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Despite the fact that local governance was central to the negotiation 
process that led to the end of Apartheid (Picard and Mogale 2015: 155), 
subsequent LGEs in South Africa have received rather low levels of 
attention outside of the country. The 2016 elections were quite different. 
In the run-up to the fifth LGEs held since 1995/96, dramatic scenarios 
were discussed with regard to the future of the dominant-party state and 
Jacob G. Zuma, who is president of both the country and the ruling 
party. Given the government’s poor record on service delivery and its 
failure to close the ever-widening gap between rich and poor, but more 
importantly on endemic corruption and party infighting associated with 
Zuma in particular, most observers not only expected fiercely contested 
elections, but nothing less than dramatic outcomes, especially in the eight 
biggest cities (or metropolitan municipalities). However, this happened 
to only some degree. 
Though for the first time since 1994 the ANC’s electoral support 
fell to below 60 per cent, it was reaffirmed as the dominant party. How-
ever, compared to the last LGEs held in 2011, on average the ruling 
party lost some eight percentage points. The official opposition party, 
the DA, led by Mmusi Maimane, gained some two and a half percentage 
points, and the EFF, led by former ANC Youth League leader Julius 
Malema, which for the first time contested LGEs, got 8 per cent of the 
valid votes cast. The ANC lost three of the seven metros it held before 
the LGEs. Though it can still rely on its rural electorate, the party seems 
to be losing the growing urban population. 
Run-up to the 2016 LGEs 
Since 1994 the ANC has dominated all general and local elections (on 
the LGEs, see Mangcu 2015). However, in the 2011 LGEs the party’s 
support declined in eight out of nine provinces – “Still on top, but ANC 
is left shaken,” the Sunday Times titled its election post-mortem (Moyo 
2012; see also Kersting 2012). Although the ANC also dominated the 
last general election, held in May 2014 (see Engel 2014; Ndletyana and 
Maserumule 2015), dissatisfaction with the ruling party has grown.  
The general social conditions have been deteriorating for a number 
of years: officially, the unemployment rate is 27 per cent (unofficially 
above 40 per cent); the post-1994 generation is worse off economically 
than their parents; service delivery, the primary function of local gov-
ernment, is poor and has constantly triggered protests – some of which 
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turned violent;1 and in recent years people have had to get used to regu-
lar power cuts under the state-owned provider, Eskom. 
To make things worse, President Zuma provoked a heavy plunge of 
the South African currency, the rand (down from ZAR 15.25 per euro to 
ZAR 17.42 and – in January 2016 – even ZAR 18.36), and risked the 
country’s credit worthiness when, on 9 December 2015, he fired the 
finance minister, Nhlanhla Nene, only to replace his little-known succes-
sor David van Rooyen four days later with the man who was finance 
minister directly before Nene, Pravin Gordhan. In this context, the dep-
uty finance minister, Mcebesi Jonas, revealed in March 2016 that the 
Indian Gupta brothers had offered the position of finance minister to 
him. “State capture” by vested business interests became a catchy slogan 
– at least until April 2016, when the Gupta family left the country for 
Dubai under still not fully disclosed circumstances. Zuma (“Zupta”) 
certainly was suspected of no longer separating state and private family 
interests. 
On 31 March 2016 the Constitutional Court found that Zuma “failed 
to uphold, defend and respect the Constitution” because he did not abide 
by the Public Protector’s directive to repay some of the ZAR 215.9 million 
(USD 14.7 million) spent on a swimming pool and animal enclosures at his 
home in Nkandla, KwaZulu-Natal (see Public Protector 2014). On top of 
this, on 24 June 2016 the Pretoria High Court dismissed a Zuma appeal, 
effectively stating that he could still be investigated for 783 cases of cor-
ruption that were buried just before his nomination as president in 2009.  
All of this brought Zuma into a very difficult situation that he only 
managed to fence just before the 2016 LGEs. In March 2016, the Oliver 
and Adelaide Tambo Foundation, the Nelson Mandela Foundation, and 
the Ahmed Kathrada Foundation, as heirs of the liberation struggle, ex-
pressed their deep concern over “the current course on which our country 
is headed,” going on to state, “We believe this course is contrary to the 
individual and collective legacy of our Founders.”2 A few days later, Gen-
eral Siphiwe Nyanda (the former chief of the defence forces, 2005–2010, 
and commander of the ANC’s liberation army Umkhonto we Sizwe [Spear 
of the Nation, MK] in Angola, 1983–1988) presented a memorandum to 
the ANC general secretary, Gwede Mantashe, calling on President Zuma 
to step down. He did so on behalf of 25 former senior commanders and 
1  This issue already played a key role in the 2006 LGEs (see Bauer 2009: 37–41). 
On the nexus between violent protest and protest around poor service delivery, 
see Amtaika (2013: 291–308). 
2  See <https://martinplaut.wordpress.com/2016/03/20/we-are-deeply-concerned-
about-south-africas-current-course/> (10 April 2016). 
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commissars of the armed struggle against Apartheid: “We call on the lead-
ership of the ANC to act against this tendency and reclaim its dignity. We 
must free the ANC and the State from the influence of the Guptas and 
their beneficiaries.”3 On 5 April 2016 Zuma survived an impeachment in 
the National Assembly by 233 to 143 votes.4 It was widely discussed 
whether Zuma would have to step down as ANC leader before or just 
after the LGEs, or whether he could hold onto the presidency of the party 
until the next ANC national conference, scheduled for December 2017 
(see, for instance, Branson 2016; Tull 2016). 
Against this backdrop, only 59.3 per cent of the voting-age popula-
tion participated in the 2014 general election. A key question for the 
2016 LGEs, therefore, was whether opposition parties would manage to 
mobilise in high numbers voters who were unhappy with the ANC gov-
ernment. The campaigns themselves were remarkably devoid of content:  
The ANC has simply used race, the DA has used Mandela, the EFF 
has used anger. […] The ANC has relied on the past, rather than 
policy throughout this campaign. This has been a campaign domi-
nated by personalities, and the squabbles, petty and personal, be-
tween them. Not unlike elsewhere in the world, LGE 2016 was 
more about politics of identity than politics of delivery.5 
The Results of the 2016 LGEs  
As of 1 June 2016 a total of 26,333,353 voters were registered, of which 
1.38 million represented new registrations (out of which 547,534 were 
first-time voters aged 18 to 19 years; IEC 2016a). This was approximately 
77 per cent of the voting-age population (estimated to be approximately 
34.2 million). The turnout of the 2016 LGEs was 57.97 per cent – a slight 
increase compared to the 57.64 per cent turnout in 2011. Figures across 
provinces vary considerably, from 63.47 per cent in Western Cape to 
50.33 per cent in Limpopo. Thus, roughly 46.15 per cent of the voting-age 
population participated in the 2016 LGEs – 13.19 percentage points fewer 
3  See <https://africajournalismtheworld.com/2016/03/28/south-africa-former-
mk-head-nyanda-calls-on-zuma-to-make-dignified-exit/> (10 April 2016). 
4  See <www.bdlive.co.za/national/2016/04/05/zuma-easily-survives-impeachm 
ent-vote> (10 April 2016). 
5  Stephen Grootes, LGE 2016: Payback Time from the ANC’s Old Leaders, in: 
Daily Maverick, 2 August 2016, online: <www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2016-
08-02-lge-2016-payback-time-from-the-ancs-old-leaders/#.V71WNTXQNaU> 
(2 August 2016). 
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than in the 2014 general elections, but 7.26 points more than in the 
1995/96 LGEs.  
According to the Local Government: Municipal Electoral Act 27 of 
2000, read with the electoral regulations issued by the Independent Elec-
toral Commission (IEC), local elections are governed by a mixed-mem-
ber proportional (MMP) electoral system, combining the proportional 
representation (PR) and first-past-the-post systems (FPTP). Thus, there 
are votes for party wards and party lists. 
The ANC lost 8.06 percentage points against the 2011 LGEs and 
8.24 points against the 2014 general elections (see Table 1). The DA 
gained 2.95 points (or +4.66 against the 2014 general elections). Running 
for the first time in LGEs, the EFF got 8.2 per cent of the vote (against 
6.35 per cent in the 2014 general elections). The Inkatha Freedom Party 
(IFP) received 4.25 per cent of the votes, which was an improvement 
against the 2014 general elections and the 2011 LGEs, with respective 
gains of 1.85 and 0.68 percentage points. 
Compared to the 2011 LGEs, the ANC lost considerably in all 
provinces but KwaZulu-Natal (+0.69 percentage points) – on average 
dropping 8.06 points (here and in the following, see IEC 2016b). Its 
biggest losses occurred in North West (-14.65), Gauteng (-13.81), and 
Limpopo (-11.84). And compared to the first LGEs held in 1995/96, 
over the past 20 years only in KwaZulu-Natal and Northern Cape has 
the ANC managed to increase its average vote (+24.88 and +9.26 points, 
respectively). In all other provinces it has lost votes – most dramatically 
in Western Cape (-10.88 points in absolute terms, or, 29.23 per cent of 
the share of its votes), North West (-14.92 points / -20.08 per cent), and 
Eastern Cape (-15.59 / -19.27). Still, in all provinces but Western Cape 
the ANC maintains a majority of votes against the DA. The difference 
between the two parties varies from a huge 60.69 percentage points in 
the mainly rural Limpopo to 8.64 points in the much more urbanised 
Gauteng Province (average national difference: 27.02 points). 
At the same time, the DA has on average improved by 2.95 per-
centage points – with slight losses in Mpumalanga (-0.85 points) and 
North West (-0.97) that were compensated for by gains in Western Cape 
(+5.63 points), Gauteng (+3.78), and Eastern Cape (+3.5). In some 
provinces, the DA did not manage to come in second: the IFP captured 
the second-most votes (18.39 per cent) ahead of the EFF in KwaZulu-
Natal, and the EFF was runner-up to the ANC in Limpopo and North 
West (16.73 and 15.52 per cent, respectively). 
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Countrywide, the EFF held an average of 8.20 per cent of all votes, 
with considerable variation across provinces (from a 16.73 per cent high 
in Limpopo to a mere 2.81 per cent in Western Cape). In this year’s 
absence of the IFP breakaway, the National Freedom Party (NFP), 
which had not paid its party registration fee and therefore was not al-
lowed to stand for election, the IFP got 4.25 per cent on aggregate and 
also recovered slightly in KwaZulu-Natal (up 2.59 percentage points to 
18.39 per cent). Symbolically important, it hung on to the wards of 
Nongoma (home of the Zulu King Goodwill Zwelithini) and Nkandla 
(home of the Zuma family), but the results were a far cry from the 
party’s dominance in 2000 (52.95 per cent vs. 96.71 per cent, and 54.00 
vs. 92.25 per cent, respectively). 
Of all the very minor parties, the African Independence Congress 
(AIC) – a party founded in 2005 in protest of a land transfer between 
Eastern Cape and KwaZulu-Natal – came in first with 0.78 per cent of 
the vote, followed by the mainly Boer and conservative Vryheidsfront 
Plus (VF Plus, 0.77 per cent) and the United Democratic Movement 
(UDM, 0.56 per cent), which was founded in 1997 as an ANC/NP 
breakaway. The AIC achieved above-average results in Eastern Cape 
(1.33 per cent) and Gauteng (1.12 per cent); the VF Plus in Free State 
(1.97 per cent), North West (1.83 per cent), and Northern Cape (1.42 per 
cent); and the UDM in its traditional heartland, Eastern Cape (3.68 per 
cent). In some areas, independent candidates fared rather well (on aver-
age 1.14 per cent but, for instance, in Buffalo City 2.69 per cent and in 
Mangaung 2.47 per cent). 
There are also some real niche parties that campaigned only locally, 
such as the Bushbuckridge Residents Association (2.25 per cent in Mpu-
malanga) and the Forum 4 Service Delivery (3.1 per cent in North West), 
in addition to the 2008 ANC breakaway Congress of the People (COPE, 
with 2.54 per cent in Northern Cape, but only 0.44 per cent countrywide – 
after a remarkable 7.42 per cent in the 2009 general elections). 
Contested Metropolitan Municipalities 
As directed by the Constitution, the Local Government: Municipal 
Structures Act 117 of 1998 contains criteria for determining when an 
area must have a category-A municipality (metropolitan municipalities) 
and when municipalities fall into categories B (local municipalities) or C 
(district municipalities). There are eight metropolitan areas with a com-
bined 20.5 million citizens (2011, i.e. roughly two-fifths of the country’s 
population), six of them established in 2000 and two in 2011. In the run-
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up to the 2016 LGEs, these metros were considered to be the major sites 
of electoral contestation and possible political change of the South Afri-
can political party system (see Mabin 2006). Not surprisingly, both the 
ANC and the DA concentrated their electoral campaigns on these areas. 
In 2000 the following metros were established: Cape Town (Western 
Cape); Nelson Mandela Bay (Port Elizabeth, Eastern Cape); eThekwini 
(Durban, KwaZulu-Natal); Johannesburg Gauteng); Tshwane (Pretoria, 
Gauteng); and Ekurhuleni (Germiston, Gauteng). In addition, Buffalo City 
(East London, Eastern Cape) and Mangaung (Bloemfontein, Free State) 
were designated metropolitan municipalities in 2011. Elections were also 
held for 44 district municipalities and 207 local municipalities. 
The ANC lost its majority in three of the seven metros it held. 
Losing Nelson Mandela Bay in Eastern Cape may have hurt it most in 
symbolic terms (see Prevost, Steyn Kotze, and Wright 2014). The reign-
ing party lost 10.99 percentage points to end up at 40.92 per cent, and 
the DA gained 6.58 points to make it 46.71 per cent. The ANC also lost 
its absolute majority to the DA in Tshwane (41.22 per cent as opposed 
to 55.32 per cent in 2011 vs. 43.11 per cent as opposed to 38.65 per cent 
in 2011). It also lost its absolute majority, but remained the strongest 
party, in Johannesburg (44.55 per cent, down from 58.56 per cent in 
2011) and in Ekurhuleni (48.64 per cent, down from 61.63 per cent). 
Still, in these two metros the DA failed to win a majority (38.37 per cent 
and 33.65 per cent, respectively). However, the ANC held on to Buffalo 
City (58.74 per cent, previously 70.01 per cent), Mangaung (56.52 per 
cent), and eThekwini (56.01 per cent). In Cape Town, the DA extended 
its majority from 60.92 to 66.61 per cent of the vote, while the ANC lost 
8.54 percentage points to come in second (26.22 per cent). The EFF 
achieved above-average results in the Gauteng metros of Ekurhuleni 
(11.23 per cent), Johannesburg (11.09 per cent), and Tshwane (11.23 per 
cent), while it showed rather weak results in Cape Town (3.17 per cent) 
and Durban (3.44 per cent). 
Thus, only in four of the eight metropolitan areas does any of the 
parties have an outright majority of seats: the ANC in Buffalo City, 
eThekwini, and Mangaung, and the DA in Cape Town (see Table 2). But 
there is no clear-cut majority for any party in Ekurhuleni, Johannesburg, 
Nelson Mandela Bay, or Tshwane. In addition, there are another 23 hung 
councils (IEC 2016b). Thus, already with a view to the 2019 general 
elections political parties will have to think about forming coalition gov-
ernments and negotiate their programmes accordingly. In the past, coali-
tion policies have been practised only at council level and in Cape Town 
(since 2002), but not in other metros (Netswera 2012).
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Table 2. Seats Held by Political Parties in Municipalities  
2016 and 2011 
Municipality ANC DA EFF Other 
2016 2011 2016 2011 2016 2011 2016 2011 
Buffalo City 
(Eastern Cape) 
60 71 24 21 8 - 8 8 
Cape Town 
(Western Cape) 
57 73 154 135 7 - 13 13 
Ekurhuleni 
(Gauteng) 
109  125 77 62 25 - 13 15 
eThekwini 
(KwaZulu-
Natal) 
126 126 61 43 8 - 20 35 
Johannesburg 
(Gauteng) 
121 153 104 190 30 - 15 17 
Mangaung (Free 
State) 
58 65 27 26 9 - 6 6 
Nelson Mandela 
Bay (Eastern 
Cape) 
50 63 57 48 6 - 7 9 
Tshwane 
(Gauteng) 
89 118 93 82 25 - 7 10 
Source: IEC (2016b).  
Note: Majority of seats indicated in bold.  
So, what’s changed? 
Pre-election polls had already indicated rising levels of frustration with 
the ANC and a lack of trust not only in the Zuma administration but 
also in the democratic system (Branson 2016: 3; Lekalake 2016). Thus, 
the results do not really come as a big surprise. Most are in line with mid-
term electoral trends – though they clearly have been accelerated by the 
public’s perception of the ANC’s performance under the Zuma admin-
istration. The ANC’s hegemony has come under attack, especially in the 
metropolitan municipalities and their townships (Paret 2016), yet the 
dominant-party state (Southall 2005) has proved to be fairly stable. The 
2016 LGEs strongly suggest that the future of South African politics, 
both at national and subnational levels, will be decided in two arenas: the 
ANC and the metros.  
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Overall, the post-Apartheid party system continues to steadily evolve: 
After the demise of the National Party and the IFP in the late 1990s, the 
DA continued its rise as the official opposition party while the EFF 
seems to be the first ANC breakaway with some chance to last. The 
development of a two-party system (Amtaika 2013: 265f.) is not on the 
cards. The DA has profited from a generally changing voting pattern, 
which has both attested to the apparently decreasing role of ethnic iden-
tity (“race”) and managed to mobilise supporters of former ANC Presi-
dent Thabo Mbeki who would not want to vote pro-Zuma. Many voters 
clearly did not consider the DA a “white” party, as was suggested by the 
ANC who again tried to “play the race card” (on the ANC’s 2011 racial-
nationalist campaign, see Moyo 2012: 371). The often-provocative pro-
test party EFF continued its slow ascent. In negotiations about coalitions 
in the metros, the EFF will now be tasked with figuring out how to ready 
itself for actual government service. The IFP that once was striving to 
compete with the ANC on a national level remains a party with relevance 
only in KwaZulu-Natal and – despite its momentary recovery – even 
there, it has been relegated to the status of a rural party.  
The 2016 LGEs also show that in the margins of the country’s pol-
ity there are still chances for minority parties, whether they are based on 
religion (e.g. the African Christian Democratic Party, 0.42 per cent on 
aggregate; Al Jama-ah in Western Cape, 0.43 per cent), ethnicity (e.g. the 
VF Plus, 0.77 per cent), regionalism (IFP), or class (rent-payers’ associa-
tions). Results in many provinces also indicate that issue-specific inde-
pendents (1.14 per cent) have a marginal chance to garner some support 
where specific local policy agendas trump regional/national ones.  
At the time of writing, little can be said about electoral behaviour. 
The trend would suggest that the born-free generation, whose members 
largely did not register for the 2014 general elections, have continued not 
to express political preferences through the ballot box – somewhat 
contradicting a hope expressed by Schoeman and Puttergill (2007: 152) 
after the 2006 LGEs. However, the massive #RhodesMustFall campaign 
that questioned the current memorialisation policy regarding the Apart-
heid legacy and the student protests against study fees in 2015 (#Fees-
MustFall) seem to indicate that this generation is not that apolitical at all. 
Regardless of the many dynamics evident in the 2016 LGEs, the fun-
damental deficits of subnational governance in South Africa still need to 
be firmly addressed. As Picard and Mogale (2015: 254) neatly summarise,  
What is unique in South Africa is the continued bifurcation of gov-
ernance and service delivery patterns in the so-called developed ver-
sus underdeveloped parts of the country. Race continues to be a 
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factor in South African governance at all levels, but particularly at 
subnational levels because people of different races (except for a 
small upper-middle-class elite) tend to be segregated geographically 
from each other. 
Plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose (“What goes around comes around”). 
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Der nächste Alptraum für „Zupta“: Die südafrikanischen 
Kommunalwahlen vom 3. August 2016 
Zusammenfassung: Am 3. August 2016 wurden in Südafrika die fünften 
Kommunalwahlen seit dem Ende der Apartheid im Jahr 1994 abgehalten. 
Vor dem Hintergrund zunehmender politischer Frustration wegen der 
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schwachen Leistungen der Regierungspartei und anhaltender Debatten 
über Korruption und Vetternwirtschaft in höchsten Regierungskreisen 
konnte der African National Congress (ANC) seine führende Position 
wahren, verlor aber 8 Prozent der insgesamt abgegebenen Stimmen und 
kam auf 53,91 Prozent. Die Democratic Alliance (DA) konnte 3 Prozent 
zulegen und kam auf 26,89 Prozent der Stimmen, und die Partei Eco-
nomic Freedom Fighters (EFF), die zum ersten Mal an Kommunalwahlen 
teilnahm, erreichte 8,02 Prozent. Von Bedeutung ist, dass der ANC die 
Kontrolle über drei der sieben von ihm bislang gehaltenen Großstadtregio-
nen (Metropolitan Municipalities) verloren hat. Weil es in vier der beste-
henden acht Metropolregionen keine eindeutigen Mehrheitsverhältnisse 
gibt, werden Koalitionspolitik und die Fähigkeit zur Kompromissfindung 
in den kommenden Jahren wesentliche Merkmale südafrikanischer Politik 
sein. Die Wahlen waren durch einen lebendigen Parteienwettbewerb ge-
kennzeichnet und werden als frei und fair angesehen. Mit 57,97 Prozent 
lag die Wahlbeteiligung geringfügig über der von 2011. 
Schlagwörter: Südafrika, Kommunalwahl, Wahlergebnis/Abstimmungs-
ergebnis, Politische Partei 
